This is an angry book. On practically every page French has something withering to say about a Western diplomat, or an African leader, or a thug at a checkpoint trying to extort money. They have all contributed in their own way to the lost opportunities and staggering suffering of a continent with extraordinary potential. French, an African American born in Washington, D.C., spent more than two decades in Africa, first as a translator and then as a journalist. He has stories to tell, and a few scores to settle, and in A Continent for the Taking he does both in a compelling way. His book does not range across the whole of Africa, as the title might suggest. Rather, French focuses on a few countries where he has significant experiences to relate, among them Nigeria, Liberia, Mali, the Republic of Congo, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (formerly Zaire).

Perhaps the most gripping and interesting part of the book is French’s account of the fall of Mobutu and the rise of Kabila in the DRC in 1997. French won awards for his reporting on this incident for the New York Times, and he offers more than simply a gripping story about the dissolution and chaos of the end of one regime and the rise of another. He argues that the United States, attempting to make up for turning a blind eye to the Rwandan genocide three years earlier, again turned a blind eye to Ugandan and Rwandan efforts to use Kabila as a proxy to dominate their much larger neighbour. French claims that in this they were heavily influenced by the strongly pro-Kagame slant of Philip Gourevitch’s We Regret to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our Families. (I have occasionally wondered whether subsequent events led Gourevitch to revise his opinion of Kagame; I don’t think I’ve seen anything else on the subject by Gourevitch since I read Regret to Inform). Unfortunately, backing Kabila at the crucial moment meant backing away from the most credible democratic figure in the DRC. Once again, the US’s involvement in the region was cynical and counterproductive. The Rwandan and Ugandan invasion-by-proxy of the DRC marked the beginning of an absolutely catastrophic war that claimed the lives of millions.

This book has a lot to recommend it: close observations of people from all walks of life, reflections on the depiction of African issues in the Western media, trenchant critiques of the foreign policies of outside actors in African affairs. But perhaps the book’s greatest virtue is simply that it made me very curious to learn more about the entire continent: about the ancient culture of Mali; the history of Belgium in the Congo; the Ashante and their struggle with the British, and so much more.

The U.S. military is embarking on a long-term push into Africa to counter what it considers growing inroads by al Qaeda and other terrorist networks in poor, lawless and predominantly Muslim expanses of the continent.

The Pentagon plans to train thousands of African troops in battalions equipped for extended desert and border operations and to link the militaries of different countries with secure satellite communications. The initiative, with proposed funding of $500 million over seven years, covers Algeria, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Nigeria, Morocco and Tunisia — with the U.S. military eager to add Libya if relations improve.

The Pentagon is also assigning more military officers to U.S. embassies in the region, bolstering the gathering and sharing of intelligence, casing out austere landing strips for use in emergencies, and securing greater access and legal protections for U.S. troops through new bilateral agreements.

The thrust into Africa is vital to head off an infiltration by international terrorist groups, according to senior U.S. military, Pentagon and State Department officials. The groups are recruiting hundreds of members in Africa and Europe, attacking local governments and Western interests, and profiting from tribal smuggling routes to obtain arms, cash and hideouts, they say. Meanwhile, small groups of Islamic radicals are moving into Africa from Iraq, where Africans make up about a quarter of the foreign fighters, the officials say.

Foreshadowing a new phase in the war against terrorism, the Pentagon plan is to mobilize Africans to fight and preempt militant groups while only selectively using U.S. troops, who are already taxed by operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. But in mustering African forces, the U.S. military confronts not only a highly elusive enemy across a vast, desolate terrain but also the competing agendas of authoritarian African governments and corrupt and chaotic militaries on the ground.

So . . . yeah. If the U.S. trains the troops well in counter-terrorism (very difficult), and the troops don’t use their new skills to further entrench authoritarian regimes, and if the latter should happen, those rebelling against the authoritarian regimes don’t come to associate the U.S. with the repression and provide fresh momentum to the global jihadist movement against the U.S. – (big breath) well, then there are some possible benefits to the policy. Because there clearly are Islamic radicals in Africa, and those radicals might provide assistance to global jihadists that the U.S. has a legitimate interest in combating. (Think of bin Laden in Sudan, or other Al Qaeda figures in Somalia.) It’s not crazy to hope to do something or other about that.

But how plausible is it to think that those conditions will be met? Not very, in my opinion. We’ve been here before, for example with the School of the Americas. (The WaPo piece I quote from above is extraordinary in that it completely omits this obvious historical parallel, even though I’m willing to bet that the reporter had it in mind.)

Let me make a prediction: This will backfire. Soldiers trained by the U.S. will inevitably help to prop up authoritarian regimes, even if it says specifically in their training manuals not to. They will commit atrocities. U.S. administrations will make a show of trying to restrain this behaviour while at the same time lying about the exact connections between troops benefiting from U.S. training and those atrocities. They will fool no one. And even where the connection between the training and the atrocities and the support for authoritarian regimes is fairly remote, the whole thing will look bad. Whatever gains the policy has produced will be eaten away by the damage done to U.S. reputation and influence – reputation and influence that is absolutely necessary to fighting the war on terror. It just won’t be worth it.

This is the way you lose a war of ideas.

(Hat tip to Kegri.)

Awful. Just awful.

Small Arms and Conflict in West Africa

For over a decade, Human Rights Watch has monitored crisis and conflict in West Africa, documented human rights abuses, and pressed for action to stop the abuses. One aspect of this work has been our effort to research arms flows to trouble-spots, including in violation of United Nations arms embargoes, and call for better controls. Today I would like to draw on the findings of our arms-related research to offer an assessment of the impact of small arms in West Africa and make recommendations for United States policy.

The conflict-ridden West African subregion is a sad showcase of the human rights and humanitarian costs of the uncontrolled proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Quantities of arms have flowed to the region despite the rampant misuse of such weapons by state and non-state actors alike. The widespread availability of small arms to abusive actors, in West Africa as elsewhere, greatly contributes to further atrocities and makes peace harder to achieve.

Today I want to focus on three main concerns: first, how weapons are making their way to such forces, through both international transfers and the recycling of weapons within the subregion; second, how those weapons are misused and contribute to conflict, and; third, the impact of small arms on the pervasive use of militia forces and foreign fighters in the subregion�s conflict areas. Each of these areas shows that action to halt small arms proliferation and punish abuses must be a key essential element of wider strategies to help West Africa move toward peace and respect for human rights.

Arms inflows: Embargoes flouted, moratorium ignored

In principle, small arms are not supposed to be flowing into West Africa. Liberia and non-state actors in Sierra Leone are subject to mandatory U.N. arms embargoes, as they have been for years. More broadly, the member countries of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 1998 pledged not to import, export, or manufacture these weapons. But both measures have been routinely flouted, with disastrous consequences for human rights and regional security. Contributing factors include lax arms export controls in supplier countries, regional allies who provide cover and sometimes financing, and transnational arms traffickers motivated by profit. Another key factor is the ability to pay of embargoed buyers, who use misappropriated funds or trade valuable commodities such as diamonds or timber concessions for arms.

Let me cite an example drawing from Human Rights Watch�s research. In mid-2003, while conflict raged in Liberia, the government of Guinea imported mortar rounds and other ammunition from Iran. These were declared on cargo documents as �detergent� and �technical equipment.� From Guinea, the weapons cargo was forwarded to allied rebels inside Liberia who had just made two offensives on the capital, Monrovia. The rebels, of Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD), used those weapons to fire indiscriminately on civilian areas of Monrovia in what was known locally as �World War III.� Scores of civilians were killed and hundreds wounded when the mortar rounds landed in make-shift camps for displaced people and other populated areas. One of the tragedies of this case was that it was child soldiers�children as young as 11 years old�who fired many of the mortars.

Throughout 2001, 2002, and into 2003 Charles Taylor�s then government also arranged to import arms, including in August of last year. Had he been successful, the fresh arms supplies would no doubt have extended the fighting and associated human suffering. Taylor�s arms purchases have been well documented by U.N. panels of experts. They have highlighted the role of illicit arms brokers operating from Europe and elsewhere. Regional governments are also a factor; in one case Human Rights Watch helped bring to light, Taylor relied on cover from Burkina Faso.

Today we are concerned by reports from informed sources in Liberia who told Human Rights Watch that a new insurgency could be emerging in Liberia�s Nimba County. Such a development could make the area a magnet for former Taylor supporters including fighters from Sierra Leone and Guinea. Given their record of gross abuse, this would put civilians at great risk.

The human rights cost of arms flows to embargoed Liberia extend beyond that country�s borders. Some of Taylor�s ill-gotten arms were obtained on behalf of rebels in Sierra Leone during that country�s long war. His role in arming and supplying those rebels helps form the basis for the indictment of Taylor before the Sierra Leone Special Court. The Special Court argued that this military support made Taylor complicit in rebel atrocities.

Although Liberian fighters are currently being disarmed by U.N. peacekeeping forces, there are good grounds for fears that some of their arms and the regional fighters who fought alongside them are in the process of passing back over borders and fueling conflict elsewhere, most notably in Cote d�Ivoire, and thus contributing to continuing abuses against civilians.

The U.N. panel on Liberia is actively monitoring embargo enforcement and is due to report soon on their new findings. U.N. peacekeepers in the region are also contributing, including through improved information sharing between U.N. missions. This is a welcome development that should help deter sanctions-busters.

There is also a need to give teeth to the ECOWAS small arms moratorium so that it, too, will be better enforced. The moratorium, signed in 1998 and renewed in 2001, is due to expire this year. While some governments abide by its principles, others clearly do not, as shown by Guinea�s arms import on behalf of LURD. Improved capacity in the ECOWAS secretariat could help, but there is no substitute for political will.

At the moment, we are gravely concerned about reports of arms imports to Cote d�Ivoire, where the peace process is not only deadlocked, but deteriorating. New arms supplies entering the country on either or both sides could produce renewed attacks on civilians of the kind we documented in a report on the 2002-2003 conflict. During that conflict, the government procured weapons from overseas and rebels in the north apparently obtained arms via Burkina Faso, among other sources.

Circulation of weapons spreads instability

Arms exports and imports are not the only concern in volatile areas of West Africa. The circulation of arms within borders also presents major human rights problems in the subregion. In countries where tensions are high, weapons availability risks reigniting or spreading conflict and associated human rights abuses.

Nigeria provides an example of arms availability and misuse. Significant quantities of arms are available, due to active cross-border smuggling. In 2002, the Nigerian Customs Service reported that it had intercepted small arms and ammunition worth more than U.S.$30 million at border posts in a six-month period. In a single haul in November 2003, it took in a consignment of 170,000 rounds of ammunition. Just this month, the Nigerian government announced that so far in 2004 it had seized some 112,000 illegal firearms.

These weapons are finding their way into the wrong hands. Earlier this month, several hundred people were massacred in an incident of inter-ethnic conflict involving firearms and machetes. The massacre was part of a series of attacks and counter-attacks in Plateau State. The country also has experienced surges of armed violence by politically sponsored thugs, especially in connection with elections.

The country�s oil-rich Delta State has seen conflict since 2003 involving well armed ethnic militia groups and motivated in part by economic interests in stolen crude oil. These militia groups use a range of sophisticated weapons, including semi- and fully-automatic rifles, alongside more traditional weapons such as fishing spears and cutlasses. Hundreds of people have been killed in the violence in Delta State, which also resulted in the displacement of thousands and the destruction of hundreds of properties.

Mercenaries, militias wreak havoc

Just as weapons are recycled from conflict to conflict in West Africa, so too are some of the fighters. The easy availability of small arms and their circulation within and across borders facilitates the formation of new armed groups and the use of untrained civilian militias, ill disciplined fighters, and unaccountable mercenaries. The allegiance of these individuals is all too easily bought by state and non-state actors alike with the promise of looted goods or a few dollars.

These militias, private armies of thugs, and roving groups of fighters routinely commit abuses against, and often terrorize civilians. The use of such forces has been witnessed in Liberia, Sierra Leone and C�te d’Ivoire. Many of the fighters who are recruited, including former Sierra Leone rebels, are notorious for their human rights violations. They hire out their services in conflict after conflict.

It should come as no surprise that in Cote d�Ivoire�s war all sides used fighters from neighboring Liberia and at one point the western part of the country was simply overrun by foreign fighters and civilian militias. Mercenary pilots from former Soviet countries have been used in this and other conflicts in West Africa. Human Rights Watch has documented cases of indiscriminate fire by such pilots from helicopter gunships in Sierra Leone and C�te d�Ivoire. We also have documented the presence of mercenaries carrying Angolan passports in the 2002-2003 conflict in Cote d�Ivoire.

The conflict in Cote d�Ivoire nominally ended in July 2003, but the country is intensely divided. It is effectively split in two with government-held areas in the south and territory controlled by rebels in the north. Civilians continue to suffer at the hands of both sides and their associated militias. Small arms are often the tools of their abuse.

A demonstration in March was the scene of a violent crackdown that lasted days and, according to a U.N. report, took at least 120 people�s lives, many of them from indiscriminate fire by security forces. The Ivoirian government admitted that those responsible for the deaths included government-backed militias it termed �parallel forces.� Some of these militias have reportedly been armed by the country�s security
forces.

Foreign journalists have not been spared from the wanton abuse by security forces and brazen impunity of thugs. One was shot at point-blank range by a policeman, and another recently was �disappeared� and is presumed dead. Most recently, government supporters as well as some rebel supporters have threatened to resort to violence, which could easily spiral the country back into full-blown conflict.

United States Policy

The United States can and should take steps to address these troubling trends. As West Africa�s war-torn societies confront the proliferation and misuse of small arms, the United States can enhance their efforts in a number of ways. In doing so, it should build on existing efforts and looking to wider impacts on the global small arms problem.

We support many of the constructive ideas offered by others today, including with respect to restraining U.S. arms exports to conflict regions, supporting disarmament measures, and promoting legally binding norms to prevent arms from being supplied to human rights abusers. I would suggest a few specific ideas for how to move forward.

At the regional level, I would emphasize the need to strengthen the ECOWAS small arms moratorium and its implementation. In our view, the moratorium should be expanded to encompass all weapons categories, developed into an information-exchange mechanism, and made binding. Further efforts are needed to ensure that arms exporters comply with the moratorium, which could be facilitated through full participation in the proposed information exchange.

The United States is making an important contribution by supporting security sector reform and rule of law initiatives in Liberia and has been a key supporter of accountability in Sierra Leone, particularly with respect to the Special Court for Sierra Leone. Such programs, and the issue of accountability more broadly, should be a focus of engagements with any number of countries marked by security forces who commit
abuses with impunity.

However, a chain is only as good as its weakest link, and today that link is Cote d�Ivoire. I can not stress enough the potential this conflict has to destabilize the precarious peace in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Guinea. If the situation in Cote d�Ivoire is not brought under control, it could draw in roving combatants from those nearby countries. A return to all-out war in Cote d�Ivoire could threaten many lives and also jeopardize U.S. efforts to help Liberia solidify the precarious peace it is just starting to enjoy. Weapons coming in and out of Cote d�Ivoire need to be closely monitored by all. Once the peace process is back on track and disarmament is underway, the U.S. should also push for the Ivorian
government to restructure and train the security forces.

The United States also should support monitoring of arms embargoes and accountability for sanctions-busters, and do so consistently. It should insist on compliance with arms embargoes by private actors and governments, even those allied to the U.S., as was the case with Guinea. The work of U.N. expert panels has been valuable and their recommendations should be taken up, which the United States can help ensure in concert with other members of the U.N. Security Council. One important element relates to the financing of illicit arms purchases. For example, there is need for follow-up on the auditing of revenue in Liberia to ensure that the practices of the Taylor government are
not repeated.

On the question of mercenaries, militias, and roving fighters, the U.S., through its presence in the region, could begin to help bring the problem under control by collaborating with relevant bodies to monitor and publicize their activities, especially with respect to how these rogue elements are armed and financed.

The United States also can exercise leadership on the global agenda to address some of the fundamental problems that contribute to human rights catastrophes in West Africa and elsewhere. One key area is the need for global measures to control the activities of arms brokers. Another is developing, adopting, and adhering to minimum global standards for arms exports, so that weapons are not furnished to known abusers. Strict human rights standards also must be upheld when granting military assistance. U.S. legislation circumscribing such assistance on human rights grounds offers a useful model that could be promoted abroad.

Conclusion

The problems of small arms, conflict and human rights abuses in West Africa are interwoven. The spread and misuse of small arms helps fuel conflict, and conflict generates a market for more weapons. These weapons, in the hands of combatants who have a history of indifference for the principle of civilian immunity, lead to egregious violations against innocent people. Mercenaries and arms traffickers make a tidy profit off their trades, and the combatants can often count on outside support to finance their wars. But it is the civilians who ultimately pay the price. And it is for them that we must strive to undo the deadly dynamic that has consumed much of West Africa. I hope today is a step in that direction.

Thank you.

Alone the same lines, Lewis MacKenzie in the National Post blasts the failure of the UN to deal at all with the carnage in Central Africa:

Like it or not, the UN is no longer capable of finding adequate resources, read countries, willing to sacrifice their sons and daughters in uniform for someone else’s human rights, unless the conflict threatens world peace and security or is in America’s self-interest to get involved.

Apply that criteria to the situation in the Congo and you get little interest and no action writ large. Africa, in general, and the complicated situation in the Congo don’t register on the “must-do” list of the Security Council. Observers wax eloquent on how the Security Council would have acted to stop the potential genocide in Rwanda in 1993 if only they had known of Canadian General Roméo Dallaire’s forecast of genocide and his plea for additional soldiers to try and thwart it. Balls! The Permanent Five veto-holding members of the Security Council knew a hell of a lot more about what was going on in Rwanda and what was being planned by the Hutus than General Dallaire, who had virtually zero intelligence-gathering capability in his tiny command. They chose to do nothing because they had no national self-interests in Rwanda.

MacKenzie’s conclusion is on less firm ground, I think. MacKenzie argues that peacekeeping is obsolete because the Security Council is dependent on credible armies and significant international consensus:

The Congo is a perfect example of a crisis the UN should be able to resolve without the leadership of the United States — by deploying the force necessary to sort out the thugs and goons who currently control the streets and jungles. The fact that the UN is not capable of doing so should be the final piece of evidence to convince even the most optimistic among us that it is incapable of carrying out the role assigned it in 1945 as the primary instrument responsible for international peace and security.

Those numerous Canadian commentators who call for our immediate participation in the Congo as “peacekeepers” display a disturbing ignorance of the profound change that has taken place regarding conflict since the end of the Cold War. Peacekeeping was a key component of our foreign policy for almost 50 years. It was a good run, but the concept is pretty well dead and buried and it’s time for its inventor — us — to admit it. Mercifully, countries rarely go to war these days, but factions within countries are fighting in more than 50 conflicts as you read this. If the UN is to take on stopping the slaughter it needs the participation of professional militaries trained for combat in sufficient numbers to defeat — euphemism for kill in most cases — the perpetrators of these war crimes. The concept of a neutral and impartial role for the UN in such conflicts is dangerous wishful thinking, and wrong. Like it or not, this fact, based on compelling evidence accumulated over the past decade, should be serious food for thought as the federal government undertakes the long-overdue foreign and defence policy review as promised by prime ministerial contenders Paul Martin and John Manley.

It’s not clear to me what MacKenzie is proposing as an alternative to the UN here. Unilateral actions or actions undertaken without international backing? Won’t all the same problems of cycnicism and inaction attach to these actions, compounded by fresh problems that arise from a lack of international consensus? MacKenzie is obviously right that the current international system is a failure. But what does he propose in its place? Or is nothing supposed to take its place?

I’m often reminded of the crack that “never again” means “never again will the world stand by and let Germans persecute Jews in the 1940s”. We have to do something. Don’t we?

a) Much of this chaos is a result of the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The genocide played a major role in destabalizing the entire region. The roots of the current conflict are complex, of course, and I don’t want to oversimplify things. Still, every time I read about the millions who have perished in the fighting over the last few years, I am reinforced in my belief that never in history did the West have a chance to save more lives with fewer resources than 1994. If the West had acted, it could very probably have taken the edge off the worst. That’s not to say that central Africa would be a nice place now, but chances are it wouldn’t be hell on earth.

b) Pleas for help with the conflict have been issuing from the UN for a few weeks now. As far as I can tell, they’ve been met with nearly complete silence. I suppose I can understand the reluctance to intervene in a complex and perhaps intractable conflict. Still, would it hurt to report the conflict? There’s virtually nothing in the papers about this. Surely the sheer scale of human suffering warrants more mention than it’s now getting.

c) Western companies have profitted from this chaos. Central Africa is rich in resources, and the resources have played an important role in prolonging the conflict. Conflict diamonds are only the start of a long sordid tale of profit from misery. The current outrage, especially prevalent among conservatives, at French companies who did business with the former Iraqi regime would be far more convincing if the same group of outraged critics could bring themselves to condemn the Western companies currently doing business in central Africa.

AS FIGHTING CONTINUES IN BUNIA, DR OF CONGO, UN FEARS HUMANITARIAN CATASTROPHE
New York, May 14 2003 5:00PM
As heavy fighting continues to rage in the town of Bunia in northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), a top United Nations relief official today voiced fear of a looming humanitarian disaster in the area and warned of ethnic tensions that conjured up “shades of Rwanda in 1994.”

The situation on the ground in Bunia continues to be “extremely difficult and volatile,” with intense fighting going on between ethnic Hema and Lendu militias in the town itself, as well as around the airport, according to a UN spokesman. The local headquarters of the UN Organization Mission in the DRC (MONUC) is wedged in the area between the two groups.

Carolyn McAskie, the UN Deputy Emergency Relief Coordinator, told a press briefing at UN Headquarters in New York that the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation and the ethnic tensions in Bunia conjured up “shades of Rwanda in 1994,” where men, women and children rose up and attacked their neighbours.

Whole villages in and around Bunia were slaughtering each other – a deeply disturbing aspect of the hostilities that Ms. McAskie feared was “Rwanda-like,” although “nothing could match the scale of Rwanda.” Still, there had been hundreds of casualties “that we know of” in the last few weeks or so, she added, stressing that the humanitarian situation was “extremely dangerous, even desperate; the focus was on very basic life-saving interventions.”

The dire security situation – where a “rather nasty cocktail” of rebel groups and dissatisfaction with local authorities was playing on ethnic hatreds – meant that relief agencies were “down to the minimum in terms of providing the most basic human needs” such as plastic sheeting for shelter and high-protein biscuits.

Ms. McAskie noted there were just eight humanitarian personnel on the ground right now – including a surgeon, nutrition specialist, and water and sanitation expert -doing what they could. Despite the evacuations, she and others, including the UN Children’s Fund (UNICEF), were trying to keep a core group in place. Other teams and supplies were on standby, but needed a more secure environment in which to operate. Supplies were being moved up from Goma, but incoming flights tended to be sporadic. The first priority was to find a way to stop the fighting.

Asked how large a force would be needed to suppress the fighting, Ms. McAskie said Ugandan troops had been “keeping a lid on it”. They had anywhere from 7,000 to 9,000 troops. “We have 800 personnel now, and estimates of what was needed were some three times that,” she said.

Joining Ms. McAskie at the briefing was Margaret Carey of the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations. She said that the new troops would have to be able to use force. The Mission was a peacekeeping operation and, therefore, lightly armed. It was basically comprised of guard units. What was needed now was the rapid deployment of well-equipped, well-trained troops, under a mandate that permitted the use of force. In terms of the total numbers needed, she thought the key was enforcement power and capacity.

Meanwhile, UN spokesman Fred Eckhard said a shell landed in the UN Mission’s compound, killing one person and wounding 13 others. “I can now confirm the reports on the wires yesterday that one woman was killed yesterday while inside the UN Mission’s Bunia headquarters” he said, adding that a civilian was in fact killed by a stray bullet while she was in the compound, and one mortar shell also landed in the compound.

MONUC has also reported that two UN military observers have been missing since 11:00 a.m. local time Tuesday from Mongbwalu, five kilometres north of Bunia. “All attempts are being made to locate them,” Mr. Eckhard said.

There has also been an increase in the number of internally displaced persons seeking shelter at the Mission’s Bunia headquarters, and a makeshift medical clinic has been organized there to deal with the situation.

What would it take for Bush to get three cheers on this issue? After all the outrage about French and Russian companies doing business with the Iraqi regime (about which we’re shocked, absolutely shocked), it would be nice to see Bush turn his attention to American businesses who profit from other resources besides conflict diamonds in central Africa. The conflict raging in central Africa right now has complex causes, but there seems to be a consensus among experts that it has such staying power partly because the region’s natural weath helps finance the various factions, and raises the stakes of the fighting. And guess who benefits from the war that has killed somewhere in the neighbourhood of 4 million people over the last decade?

Western businesses have profited from the chaos, and it’s high time Western governments gave this whole sordid mess the chop – or at least gave it a serious try.