Terry Eagleton writes about suicide bombing in today's Guardian. There's a lot to disagree with here (and others have). I just want to note that Eagleton's piece is entirely taken up with what he takes to be the personal motives of suicide bombers. Suppose, just for the sake of argument, that Eagleton is exactly right about these motives. There is still the larger political question of what the people who order and justify suicide bombings have in mind from a strategic point of view when they order them. (I'll just focus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Eagleton also talks about the use of the tactic in Iraq.)
The leaders of Hamas are obviously under quite a bit of pressure. They no doubt suffer from moments of despair and, given their limited military capabilities, from feelings of powerlessness. But they surely also have goals in mind, which they hope that the suicide bombings they help to organize will further. To the extent that limited military capabilities and feelings of powerlessness operate higher up the chain, I suspect it is to justify or rationalize a tactic which the leaders take themselves to have independent reasons for employing.
Suicide bombing, it has always been clear, will never, ever dislodge Israel from the occupied territories. Indeed, it has long been clear that suicide bombing only strengthens the Israeli right, and helps them generate the political capital they need to press forward with their wretched policies. The only sense I have ever been able to make of suicide bombing from a strategic point of view is that it is aimed squarely at the result that it is all but guaranteed to achieve, rather than the far fetched result of improving the position of Palestinians.
I'm not saying it's a good strategy. Indeed, I think it's a stupid one. I'm saying it's the only thing I can recognize as even remotely resembling a strategy in the actions of groups like Hamas.
Why would they think this way? Well, suppose you're a radical. Suppose that you oppose any kind of reconciliation with Israel. Suppose that you find your fellow nationals dispiritingly soft and willing to compromise. You must convince them to reject any kind of accommodation. And you must recruit others to your brand of radicalism. But if you attempt this by force, you will fail, because you are weak (at first) relative to the rest of society, and because this would only alienate you from people you want to persuade and recruit. So you invite the Israeli right to do your recruiting for you. You invite reprisals and collective punishment. The collective punishment is very persuasive. Because it is collective, it is unfair, and because it is unfair and brutal, it is reasonably effective at sapping interest among Palestinians in accommodation and compromise.
The dynamic, I think, is similar within Israel. And this is why it seems a bit misleading to be always talking about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, especially when the discussions are about the Palestinians' use of suicide bombing against Israel. From a strategic point of view, though the immediate effect is (of course) to kill Israeli citizens, Palestinians suicide bombing seems to me to be aimed as much at Palestinians moderates as it is at Israelis. That's why it seems much more illuminating to talk about two simultaneous conflicts, between moderates and extremists on either side with one another.
I'm curious if anyone else has the same impression, or if people think that I've simply gone and misinterpreted Hamas. Or? Let me know in the comments.
Posted by Chris at January 26, 2005 10:36 AMI think that it is important to distinguish the goals and motivations of individual suicide bombers, and those of organizations like Hamas which sponsor suicide bombers. I think the article you describe was attemptind to explain the former, while you do a good job of explaining the latter.
Eagleton's thesis of the suicide bomber giving great import to his life through his act is not one that originated in his essay. I've heard that theory before. And, like any attempt to explain any given phenomenon, one could not reasonably expect it to apply in all cases, and there will be some circumstances where it has greater application. (A theory that does an excellent job, for example, of explaining suicide bombings by the Tamil Tigers may have less applicability to Hamas. The "Harry's Place" comments on suicide bombers speaking of a promised place in paradise, of course, seemingly has little to no relevance to the mostly Hindu Tamil Tigers.)
Posted by: Aaron at January 26, 2005 01:05 PMYes, yes. I agree about distinguishing individual goals and organizational goals (or goals of the soldiers and goals of the generals). Even more: I think that if we get this far we will still have much more work to do sorting out how different individuals understand themselves to be acting, and then in sorting out how reliable their self-understanding, both as reported, and as experienced, actually is.
Posted by: Chris at January 26, 2005 01:35 PMWhile I agree that there may well be a prevention-of-moderation element at the organizational (as opposed to individual) level to Hamas' use of suicide bombings, I don't think that's all of it. Effectively, they've painted themselves into a corner. They've been putting out for years, both to themselves and others, the image that they're these ferocious warriors, willing to do even that because it will bring them victory. But it hasn't -- if anything, just the reverse. And if they stop now (or anywhere short of their stated, and impossible, goal), it's an admission that their ultimate weapon, their trump card, has failed. And that means they've failed. They're not mighty champions, they're failures, and all those young lives were sacrificed to no purpose. Not martyrs, just mistakes.
Posted by: Achillea at January 26, 2005 04:06 PMHmmm. Yes, in this respect both Israel and Palestinian groups are in a bind. They believe, with some evidence, that demonstrating that they can be cowed in any way will only invite further attacks. That makes it a bit tricky to stop attacking, since people will always be able to construct interpretations on which they stopped because they were pressured into it.
Posted by: Chris at January 26, 2005 04:49 PMThe effects of suicide bombings on Israeli society aren't as simple. Sure, they strengthen the resolve of the right, and might sway some centrists in its direction, but they are also being used by the left to justify accomodating Palestinian demands.
Hamas spokemen repeatedly say that killing Jews is the way, and liberating all of Palestine is the goal. Why do people, in the Guardian or on this blog, insist on other, intricate meanings?
Joe, I don't think I'm insisting on an intricate meaning. I'm suggesting that for some of the Hamas leadership, the effects of the suicide bombing are simply too obvious to ignore - and that there is another way to interpret what they're doing. Also, I do think that liberating all of Palestine is the goal. I just think that the suicide bombing is a short term strategy intended to marginalize Palestinians moderates so that they don't make a deal too quickly and so stop short of liberating all of Palestine. I take it they seem themselves as in it for possibly many generations.
Perhaps you know Israeli society better than I do. I wouldn't claim to have a great handle on either Israeli or Palestinian societies. But my firm impression was that the second Intifada had been terribly demoralizing for the Israeli left, and that the suicide bombings made it very difficult for them to make their case to the Israeli public. Sharon's leadership is some evidence for this, no?
Posted by: Chris at January 26, 2005 10:47 PMThere is no question that suicide attacks strengthen the Israeli right, if you ask me. If the right seeks to dehumanise Palestinians, what better evidence could they ask for than a conflagration in a bar or restaurant?
I doubt very much that the Israeli left is able to make a serious case for acquiescence even if it wished to do so.
Posted by: lenin at January 27, 2005 08:38 AM