I see (via Juan Cole) that President Bush “has said that he would ‘accept’ an ‘Islamic Iraq’:
Things brings up some very interesting questions. Is it true that “democracy is democracy,” in the President’s sense? What is the role of democratic ideals in a democracy? Are there times, for instance, in which it is legitimate to impose such ideals on citizens who do not seem to endorse them? Or is that a blatant material breech—to use the language of Jan-Feb 2003—of those ideals themselves?
If free and open Iraqi elections lead to the seating of a fundamentalist Islamic government, "I will be disappointed. But democracy is democracy," Bush said. "If that’s what the people choose, that’s what the people choose."
We might begin to answer these questions by admitting that it is false that, so to speak, "once a democracy always a democracy." For once a political society is characterized by a totalitarian dictator who, let’s imagine, tampers with votes, declares himself the winner, and proceeds to place nonsupporters into work-camps, that society is clearly no longer a democracy. This is an example in which democratic procedures were pre-empted, and where the resulting government was not chosen by the citizens.
But once we realize this possibility, the President’s “democracy is democracy” principle seems false. For if it is not the case that “once a democracy always a democracy”, then surely it is possible for citizens to choose—in free and fair elections—to move toward and eventually achieve the sort of totalitarian state mentioned above. Isn’t clear that these citizens would have chosen democratically to relinquish their democracy?
I’m not so sure that is clear. They certainly choose so to relinquish their democracy. But the further question is whether or not this would have been done democratically. I find it hard to say that it would have been. Yet I wonder if my intuition here amounts to mere fiat. I’m inclined to say that an action—be it collective or individual—cannot be characterized as democratic if it at the same time constitutes the annihilation of the democracy that rendered it possible in the first place. If this is right, then Bush is wrong on two interpretations of what he said (although I think it’s clear he does not intend the first interpreation): (1) It is not true that democratic society stays democratic when it chooses, through free and fair elections, to implement an anti-democratic basic structure; (2) Nor is it true that a people democratically chooses to implement an anti-democratic basic structure, even when that choice embodies the abstract democratic ideal of self-government through free and fair elections.
Briefly, my view presupposes something like a notion of a democratic parameter which states a necessary condition on an action if it is truly to be a democratic action. The substance of parameters may well outrun the sorts of procedural considerations that Bush relied upon for his remark. One such non-procedural parameter would be that the action not constitute a move away from a democratic basic structure.
Such a view must deal with obvious and difficult problems. For instance, what does such a view say about a neo-Nazi who goes to the polls and writes in whoever the head of the KKK is today? Is that person not acting democratically? I say he is not. He is acting in ways that democracy allows, but he is not acting democratically. Democracy allows this voter to cast his particular vote because preventing against it would be intolerable intrusive to the actions of perfectly democratic citizens. Moreover, democracy allows this because it sees value in meeting such crazy challenges to it with civility, composure, and reasoned discourse. But this can be democracy’s tack only if such voters do not in fact constitute a threat to it. And usually they are do not. None of this, however, entails that what the Nazi does is democratic. In this sense, democracy can allow that which is anti-democratic.
It seems, then, that my view must find a redoubt between two extremes. For while I do want to say that some actions are anti-democratic and therefore must be prohibited, I have also said that some anti-democratic actions should be allowed within a democracy. It thus cannot be the case that one of democracy's parameters is that no member of society acts anti-democratically. So where do I draw the line? Earlier I suggested a criterion: disallow that which constitutes the annihilation of democracy. This is different from the criterion of disallowing that which threatens the annihilation of democracy. It may well be the case that a particular democracy brings itself closer to annihilation by stifling threatening anti-democratic behavior than it does by tolerating it.
Something similar can be true with regard to societies that are not yet democratic, such as today’s Iraq. Perhaps we would do less in the cause of democracy if we disallowed the collective choice of an fundamentalist Islamic regime in January (yeah, right) than we would if we abided the unsavory effects of such a choice. This would be reason to accept something like Bush’s position, even if we disagree with him that such a choice would be a democratic choice.
At what point does an election cease to be a democratic one? When there is one Nazi voting for the KKK platform? When there are 200? Or is it when 50% plus one vote KKK? I'm not sure. But I have argued that the last case is a case where the decision is not democratic, and that this in turn entails that the body of persons making the decision does not constitute a democracy.
Posted by Paul at October 20, 2004 06:40 PMthis very problem was faced by algeria in the early 1990s, when they were about to hold what was widely expected to be a free and fair election. the problem was, the fundamentalists were expected to win by a landslide. so the secular generals cancelled the election and a civil war broke out--oddly pitting the election-cancelling champions of western values vs. the muslim fundamentalists claiming a democratic mandate. only now is the country finally recovering from the violence.
Posted by: upyernoz at October 20, 2004 07:46 PMPaul,
By your definition, I think the election has to be democratic, whether one Nazi votes KKK or 50%+1 do. This seems to follow from your accurate point that confident democracies allow fringe nutters to operate, yadda yadda... It is the *outcome* of the election that is non-democratic - see Germany, 1933/4 etc.
I'm not sure what Bush is trying to say with this, but it could be one of two things. The straightforward interpretation would be: "We can take a horse to water but we can't make it drink." Thus the US and its allies create the most favourable possible conditions for the election in January (stop sniggering at the back there), but abide by the result, even if that is to institute a mediaeval theocracy dedicated to the elimination of Israel.
On the face of it this doesn't seem very likely. It would necessitate a massive public admission of defeat, and would be completely incompatible with the Bushites' Western Asia grand strategy.
So I'm inclined to suppose that this is a very pragmatic statement, preparing the ground for some sort of deal with the Sistani faction. Sistani can probably be relied on to maintain the facade of elections etc. within an Islamist context, even if the reality for most Iraqis is not much better than it is in Iran. A limited opposition press etc. would continue to function; targeted repression could be blamed on the continuing insurgency, allowing Bush to declare a result in the expectation that most people won't look too closely.
Which brings us back to definitions of democracy. Number one. Democratic institutions are futile in the absence of a pluralist society. Number two. There is no number two.
Posted by: chris (not that one) at October 21, 2004 08:17 AMChris,
Yes, I am open to the possibility that I'm wrong here. As I said, I'm wary of imposing a definition of "democracy" by fiat. Yet I'm still drawn to the idea that democratic institutions a democracy does not make. Let me try to add to my thinking in the post.
I guess I start with the assumption that it is definitionally true that the decisions of a democracy are legitimate: their imposition upon the losers of elections is just, moral, and appropriate. This can be true even if I think that ideal citizens would have made a different choice, where by "ideal citizen" I do not mean someone who shares my comprehensive moral view in its entirety.
For instance, Ralph Nader is running for the Presidency. Some think he should not run. Ralph has heard these charges, and sometimes replies that he has a right to run, so get off his back. His opponents are of course not trying to argue that he does not have a right to run, but rather that he should not run, that he should not exercise his right. They think that his running could lead to a government that imposes upon them far-from-ideal ideal policies. But you would be hard-pressed to find someone who thinks that a Bush victory (with, say, the imprimatur of the Carter Center) and consequent policy making would not give rise to legitimate laws, i.e. laws that we are morally obliged to follow, even if we disagree with them.
My question in the post was, Are there decisions that are made collectively and through the channels of free and fair elections that are nonetheless illegitimate, i.e. that it would be immoral to force upon the citizens (now: subjects) of the resulting government. I was trying to answer yes. And in searching for a reason why the resulting government would not warrant the compliance of it citizens, I alighted upon the possibility that the electoral decision itself was not democratic.
This led me to the supposition that a necessary condition--I don't think i offered a definition--of democratic decision making must be some sort of substantive condition that, as I put it, "outruns" the procedural conditions typically associated with "free and fair" elections.
I agree with your last comment about pluralism. And it was well-put. I think I might be able to put my point in those terms. There are two points, one familiar, the other my suggestion. First, a collective decision is not democratic unless it is made by a body of persons who are willing to abide by both the electoral institutions through which decisions are made, as well as the resulting goverment that is the object of decision. My evidence for this is the thought that a body that is prepared to revolt if democratic electoral processes do not result in a theocracy is not a democratic body. Yes, they have agreed to abide by the electoral processes--for now. But this is a means to an end, and means nothing intrinsically to them. They simply do not have requisite democratic dispositions, and so do not constitute a democracy.
The second point--my point--is that there are other dispositions that a body must have in order to be democratic. They must not only be willing to abide by democracy's procedural strictures, but also abide by certain substantive principles of political decision-making. For instance, they must not deny rights to persons based upon the color of their skin. A body that makes decisions upon a background of belief that is racist is not a democratic body.
Now my main worry is that this argument threatens to lead to a definition of democracy that is the mirror image of that liberal utopia I dream about at night. I must certainly guard against that. For while I might believe that such a utopia would include a minimum wage that is much more than even what some people today call a "living wage", I do not want to say that a society that does not have such a minimum is thereby not a democracy. So I must leave room for the possibility that a majority of citizens will not have those dispositions. But I think there is theoretical room enough for me to enumerate necessary democratic dispositions that are more substantive than the procedural ones, and yet much broader and more abstract than those characterizing my ideal citizen.
This leaves me with something like the criterion that a decision ceases to be democratic as soon as my rebellion against it would not be illegitimate. And since I think that, for all their wrongness, some (not all) of Bush's policies still (morally) command my compliance, they are democratic in my sense, even though they depart significantly from morally ideal policies.[1]
[1]And it should not be assumed that my "morally ideal" political policies would not the sort of pluralism you were talking about. Even though I do not think that political ideals are easily seperable from moral ideals, I do recognize a moral division of labor that leaves plenty of room for my citizens to live lives I wholly disagree with.
Posted by: paul at October 21, 2004 11:39 AMPaul,
Thanks for the reply. I don't think we disagree much here if at all. "Democratic institutions do not a democracy make" is very true, and hardly understood by most western politicians as far as I can see. I think the point I was trying to make was that a democracy has to permit a certain level of anti-democratic activity within itself, and that to do this and survive there are social (and economic) preconditions that have to be met.
I think if I took this much further, I would go OT by the end of the sentence, so I'd better just go away.
Posted by: chris at October 22, 2004 02:56 AM