How (not) to argue for military action in Sudan

Posted by Chris

That something awful is happening in Sudan is perfectly clear. It's also clear that certain steps might well mitigate, or even stop, what is happening. Those steps include an international campaign to name and shame the perpetrators of the atrocities and those who have actively and passively supported them, stepped up humanitarian aid, (possibly) incentives for improvement, international mediation and monitoring, and so on.

What is less clear, to me at least, is whether to use force, if it is necessary to stop the killing, and how much force to use and against which parties, and also who exactly is to use the force. I am persuadable on this issue. War may be awful, but so is the prospect of standing by while tens of thousands of people are raped, murdered and forced from their destroyed homes and villages. But to be convinced about the use of force, I need to understand a lot more about the conflict itself, and the likely effects of the various proposals to use force. I need plausible answers to questions like these:

-- How likely is Sudan to respond to military force with military force? Is it likely to call the bluffs of would be interveners?

-- How well equipped is Sudan to respond militarily? According to some reports I've read, Sudan is very well equipped militarily, thanks especially to Russia. (Other reports suggest that Sudan isn't so militarily fearsome. Frankly, I'm confused.)

-- What are the various ways in which force might be used to pressure the Sudanese regime and its unreliable proxies to stop the killing? A plausible plan needs to explain how the use of force is likely to bring about the desired results.

-- In order to secure the peace afterwards, how long would troops need to remain in the area? What are the possible negative effects of a long-term troop presence?

-- Are there any unanticipated - or perhaps I should say "not-usually-anticipated" - effects of a military intervention that we might do well to think about? Is it possible that military force might even end up producing an even worse result than we're seeing now? (Don't laugh. Iraq may well be headed towards a full-blown civil war that will be even worse than life under the Ba'ath party.)

-- Is there a chance that a military intervention will encourage a fresh round of fighting in Sudan's other civil war (between the North and the South)? After all, if the regime takes a beating, it seems very possible that Southern forces will see an irresistible opportunity to renew hostilities while the North is weak, at precisely the time when tensions between North and South seem to be easing.

-- Does force only look necessary because the search for alternative peaceful measures has been half-hearted? It may end up looking easier to just bomb parts of Sudan or send in troops (or whatever) than to apply the kind of pressure on Russia and China that might end up having a similar persuasive effect on the Sudanese regime. Putting real diplomatic pressure on Russia and China is difficult and costly. They're a prickly pair, and they're already being asked for cooperation on all kinds of fronts (Russia is especially being asked to help with non-proliferation efforts; China with North Korea; etc. etc. etc.). Still, if it is a viable option then we shouldn't kid ourselves about the "necessity" of the use of force. For in that case force will only be necessary in the weak sense that it is necessary once we've discarded possible but onerous peaceful alternatives.

-- Do the would-be interveners intend to address the various roots of the conflict, including the very unhelpful role of outsiders (like Russia and China) in providing diplomatic cover and military aid to Sudan?

-- What interests do the would-be interveners have which might complicate the intervention? Western governments, if they're the ones intervening, don't seem to have much enthusiasm for intervention in Sudan, and I don't think it would be right for people to complain (as they surely would) that they are doing it mainly for oil. But if they did intervene, it would be hard for them to ignore all that oil, and it would surely represent a corrupting temptation for the would-be interveners, and might shape their conduct during and after hostilities. (I don't mean that Western countries would start drilling for oil themselves. I mean that the desire to cut future deals with the Sudanese regime might influence the kinds of resolution to the conflict that outside parties would be willing to consider.) What about interveners like Rwanda? Doesn't Rwanda's track record in the DRC during the late 90s raise difficult questions about the likely effect of Rwandan involvement in Sudan?

Anyway, there are other questions, but even if the above list is a bit clumsy and random, it at least gives a sense of the kinds of questions we ought to be asking when we consider whether force would be justified to stop the atrocities in Darfur. It also gives a sense of the kinds of questions that someone ought to take a stab at answering when he or she attempts to persuade us to use force to stop the atrocities.

Now take a look at this piece by Johann Hari, urging action on Sudan. I take it he wants to argue for measures including the use of force, though what kind of force and how applied, he doesn't really say. He doesn't really have a chance to say, because the bulk of the column is taken up excoriating everyone for thus far failing to respond as he sees fit to the situation in Darfur. Well, excoriation is sometimes in order. I dabble a bit in excoriation myself, you know. The problem is that the concerned reader who is waiting to be persuaded by Hari is treated to little more than a chest pounding harangue about how callous, morally unserious and probably racist he or she is.

That isn't good enough. If Hari wants to insult me for being wary about the use of force in Sudan, first he needs to make a rational case for force, and he hasn't done that. I resent the idea that being morally serious mainly involves hyperventilating in public about evil. It may involve that, but just as important is a patient and careful examination of solutions which is sensitive to the possible pitfalls in each of them. When military force is involved this is absolutely the first order of business, and the main standard by which we should judge a commentator.

Just to be clear - I do see that Hari is well-intentioned, even if there is something almost macho and competitive in the way he flaunts his concern. And empathy, which he clearly has in spades, is nothing to scoff at. But empathy is a spur to reflection on practical affairs, not a substitute for it, and it is not the end of reflection, in either sense of the word "end". Force is sometimes justified, but it is dangerous, unpredictable, in general seized on too readily, and has far reaching consequences which are rarely taken into consideration when considering whether to use it. That is why there is a heavy burden of proof on anyone who wants to argue in favour of force - and insults are no help here.

What is especially odd about this is that if I'm not mistaken, not too long ago Hari spent quite a bit of energy excoriating anti-war protesters for their lack of moral seriousness, while at the same time failing to think through some of the practical difficulties besetting the Iraq War which the more serious among those protesters were worrying about. He might have learned from this experience, you know.

UPDATE: Many thanks to Hari for the the link. I hadn't read his earlier piece on Sudan. It is good, as far as it goes. My concern is that it doesn't go far enough in answering the kinds of questions I'm worried about because I think they are essential to answer before we can responsibly back the use of force. Now, I ought to acknowledge that Hari is working within real constraints as a journalist - of space, length and content - and so giving a full answer to all these questions in a column or two is tricky. But we've all still got work to do, and less time with bad arguments means more time for good ones.

What's a bad argument? I'm not comfortable with Hari's use of Rwanda in the recent piece, for example. If the point is that Western responses to Rwanda were almost entirely shameful, I agree. But one of the things that makes Rwanda so shameful is that it really does seem to have been preventable with a minimum of military force. Indeed, my understanding is that the Hutu Power thugs kept their eyes nervously on foreign reactions, especially in France, in a way that suggests they were deterrable simply by the threat of force. It is not at all obvious that what is happening in Sudan is so easily preventable, and so the cases are probably not at all analogous in this respect. As Hari knows, the two countries differ so greatly - historically, culturally, militarily - that they are not comparable in terms of the prospects for a successful intervention, even if morally the atrocities are on par. (There is an irony here: It was misleading comparisons between Rwanda and another African state, Somalia, ten years ago that helped convince the Clinton administration that nothing could be done. But of course Rwanda and Somalia are so different - historically, culturally, militarily - that no lessons about the prospects for a Rwandan intervention could be responsibly drawn simply by looking at Somalia.)

So we have to do better than this.

The point here isn't to filibuster the issue with endless questions and comments and demands for clarification. After a few months, I admit that it is rather late for me to be making up my mind. But it is a complicated question, and when I started it was virtually from zero. But I know we are running out of time. I know that for the dead and the raped and the dispossessed, it is already too late.

Posted by Chris at September 3, 2004 09:03 PM