Long-time readers know that I opposed the war but, after it was over, supported the occupation. (Since then I've gotten awfully confused. My support is now conditional, and the conditions aren't being met, so I suppose I don't support it any more.) I supported the occupation partly because I believed that the U.S. had to live up to its responsibilities as an occupying power, and partly because I believed that failing to live up to those responsibilities would have absolutely catastrophic consequences.
I don't think that my position was a mistake either, even after a disastrous occupation. But my attitude towards American allies who might have helped with the occupation, but didn't, has altered a bit. I was originally inclined to focus on the fact that it was in everyone's interests to see a stable, democratic Iraq, as well as to heal the rift between the U.S. and its allies. And although I have always had a bleak view of Iraq's post-war prospects (a major reason for opposing the war), I also wanted to be proven wrong by a successful occupation.
My view of U.S. allies has shifted a bit as a result of thinking about the way that the U.S. framed the occupation, both before and after the war. That is not to deny that Russia and China are corrupt, that France's foreign policy is cynical, and so on. But I do think that the better part of the blame for the postwar failures of diplomacy which led the U.S. to take on so much alone in Iraq, with all that that entailed, rests with the U.S.
Before you dismiss this as just more Bush-bashing, hear me out. Here is a partial list of ways that the U.S. framed matters. They were all avoidable. But it is now too late. Add your own qualifications, reservations, additions, etc. in the comments. (The list comes from an email I wrote to a correspondent a few weeks ago.)
-- The U.S. has long-term military ambitions involving Iraq, in particular a desire - never renounced - for long-term bases within the country, in order to project its power in the region. These ambitions run contrary to the wishes of most Iraqis who rightly see them as a potentially endless source of mischief in what are bound to be, at best, fractious and complicated internal politics. The reconstruction is, in the nature of things, an American-run show. So any party to the reconstruction would have had to align itself with this effort, an effort which are inimical to the health of any future Iraqi state.A wiser occupation might have succeeded, where the Bush administration failed. A wiser occupation would have loudly and publicly renounced long-term military ambitions in the country. It would have stuck scrupulously to the Geneva Convention, both in Iraq and elsewhere. It would have conducted itself with transparency and openness. It would not have undertaken fundamental "reforms" that would never have been approved by allies not inclined to market fundamentalism. And so on. Posted by Chris at August 23, 2004 01:05 PM-- The U.S. is busy violating the fourth Geneva Convention in Iraq with things like IMF-style shock therapy for the country. Obviously a lot of reordering of Iraqi society is necessary and good, but much of it has been suited to the tastes of a certain hard-right school of economic theorists and other assorted crackpots. (These particular crackpots are crackpots whose popularity is mostly limited to the U.S., so we're not even talking about popular crackpottery.) Any party to the reconstruction would have had to align itself with this effort.
-- The U.S. has been busy with other violations of the Geneva Convention, by imprisoning and, we now know, torturing Iraqis who had nothing to do with the insurgency. The extent of this was unclear early on in the occupation, but there was decent evidence of a willingness to commit war crimes from Afghanistan. (I remember that Art Eggleton, the former Canadian Defense Minister, winced visibly at an event at Cornell when I asked him about Canadian complicity in American violations of the Geneva Convention in Afghanistan. It's a touchy subject.) Any party to the reconstruction would have had, at a minimum, to align itself with the force committing these crimes.
-- The U.S. has controlled the handling of reconstruction contracts for political purposes, and the result appears to have been, as predicted, a fair amount of corruption. The legal issues are unclear to me, but there may be real legal trouble down the road because of this corruption. At any rate, any party to the reconstruction would have had to align itself with this corruption.
-- The U.S. has been mostly in charge of on-the-ground strategic decision-making. I am happy to acknowledge moments of genius and acts of heroism from the American military. But there has also been quite a bit of awful decision-making. When the contractors were murdered in Fallujah, for example, it was Bush's decision to ramp up the pressure without having thought through his end game. Same thing with the closing of Sadr's newspaper. He's a nut for sure for sure, but that move doesn't appear to have been very helpful, after all. Anyway, any party to the reconstruction would have had to align itself with crappy American leadership in these matters.
-- As a result of internal tensions within the Bush administration, the U.S. has at various times made awful decisions in order to promote proxies within Iraqi politics. I hope it's clear that I have nothing against exiles per se, but in this case the promotion of proxies has not always had happy results, or enhanced anyone's credibility. Any party to the reconstruction would have had to align itself with this policy.
-- The Bush administration made clear a long time ago that success in Iraq would lead to increased belligerence towards Syria and Iran. So any party to the reconstruction would have had to work at the same time towards goals it might fairly regard as destabilizing to the region
-- The Bush administration's pre-war diplomacy created the following dilemma for any allies By assuming (and sometimes claiming) that allies who objected to its course of action could be ignored because they would eventually come around, the Bush administration has ensured that the cost of eventually coming around is basically conceding this point. And to concede this point is to basically guarantee that your objections will not be taken seriously the next time. So any party to the reconstruction would have had to align itself with a policy whose success would entail the irrelevance of its objections to any future policy.
Chris,
If I understand you correctly, you suggest the occupation of Iraq could have been a success if things had been framed differently. Yet,the whole point of the intervention was to establish a permanent military base and take control of the economy (particularly the oil sector). Those were the central motives from the very beginning and not just unfortunate aspects of policy as you seem to imply. As to things like human rights violations, they too are part and parcel of any intervention aimed at seizing economic and military control of a country. To suggest that the intervention could have been handled differently strikes me as just fundementally wrong. No benign intervention was ever possible given the forces that influence and control US foreign policy and given the most basic motives of the intervention.
A wiser occupation might have succeeded in securing entirely different goals from what Bush and his cohorts wanted. But had the goals been different there would never have been an intervention to begin with because it wouldn't have been in anyone's interest particularly.
