I'm probably going to end up regretting this, but I'll say it anyway. Not too long ago, the Philippines pulled out of Iraq at absolutely the worst moment in absolutely the worst way. Whether or not you supported the invasion, whether or not you supported the occupation, you might still agree with me that pulling out as part of a public bargain to get a hostage released was only going to make hostage taking all the more likely in the future for those who remained in Iraq. (And to be clear I think this move only superficially resembled Spain's withdrawal.) Anyway, even if you disagree with me about that, I think everyone can agree that this was a really crushing setback for the U.S.-Phillippines relations.
Now, there was a time when the Bush administration might have dispatched Wolfie to give those naughty Filipinos a tongue-lashing. That's precisely what they did when they were disappointed with Turkey - and it only made life much harder for everyone.
Not so this time. Or at least, not as far as I can tell. (A few good counterexamples in the comments section, and I'll retract this post.) This time the State Department is firing off conciliatory press releases and I've heard nary a peep in the press about dire consequences. This is as it should be. There is still a lot of room for cooperation, and the U.S. still has enormous leverage with the Philippines, and so little would be gained by public tough talk that would only alienate the public of an ally the U.S. still has to work with.
This is not a comment about the substance of U.S.-Phillippines relations, or about the prudence of the overall terra fightin' strategy within which that relationship is largely viewed. It's a comment about style.
Anyway, I always end up feeling like an ass when I offer even the faintest praise for the Bush administration. Does anyone want to disabuse me of this illusion? Fire away in the comments.
Posted by Chris at August 16, 2004 02:21 PMYou know that I won't criticize you for this.
I wish I had the link for you, but there has been some behind closed doors friction (as in, the State Department rejected some of those conciliatory statements for being too friendly). Personally, I think that's exactly as it should be. There should be repercussions, but they need not be so public that the actual state of the relationship is misinterpreted--especially by the press--and both sides lose control as assumed hostility gets a life of its own. France and the US, for example, still extensively cooperate on a number of things, but both sides so horribly mismanaged the relationship that no one remembers that we cooperate.
Posted by: Nathan at August 16, 2004 07:36 PMExactly right. I expect there was plenty of screaming behind closed doors. What I need as a counterexample to force me to back down on this is a clear case in which a Bush official made a public, boorish remark that made compromise and cooperation much more difficult and politically less palatable.
That's an awfully low standard by the way. But it's still interesting if the Bush administration is meeting it, since it often hasn't in the past.
Posted by: Chris at August 16, 2004 08:11 PMI think you might be a little harsh on the Philippines. Maybe there move will make hostage taking more likely in the future. On otherhand, that might be better than just making outright killings the norm. The idea of 'we mustn't negotiate' with terrorists makes tactical sense in a lot of situations but not when violence is a day-to-day occurrence rather than a once in a blue moon sort of thing.
Posted by: peter at August 17, 2004 04:28 AMWell, personally I'm very sceptical of a lot of the tough talk about never negotiating with terrorists. I think it depends on the terrorists and their goals. With bin Laden, I don't really think any negotiation is possible. With insurgents in Iraq, I imagine it depends on their goals - but I wouldn't be above negotiating with some insurgent groups.
In the case of the Philippines, I really do think that capitulating in response to a specific hostage taking crisis really did seem to confirm the usefulness of the basic tactic. And if my sense of day to day violence on the ground in Iraq isn't mistaken, I think that really did have an effect on the popularity of the tactic - though obviously it was not the sole cause of the popularity of the tactic.
If you really are going to go into an occupation like Iraq, I don't think you should withdraw in exchange for a prisoner release. You should either stay in or not have gone in at all.
But all this is really a distraction from the main point which is that the Bush administration has been uncharacteristically balanced in its public remarks on the case. (Even if I'm wrong in my estimate of the harm done by the Philippines here, the important thing is that my estimate shared in common with virtually all of the U.S. government.) That point is quite distinct from the other, far more critical, points we could make about the larger context of the diplomacy. But it is nevertheless interesting to note.
Posted by: Chris at August 17, 2004 10:09 AM