Chomsky on Osirak, again

Posted by Chris

Peter and I are still going back and forth on the Osirak strike. I think it might be time to call in Chomsky to explain himself, but in the meantime let me explain why I think Peter and Chomsky are just wrong about the main causes of Iraq's nuclear program. Peter writes:

As I understand it, Iraq in the early 80s had a lot of reasons to think they could win and maybe even win easily against Iran. If nothing else, a country rarely starts a war unless it has a fair bit of confidence about it chances. As far as I know such predictions of success were born out for a few years into the war. Furthermore, Iraq enjoyed significantly more diplomatic support both regionally and internationally than did Iran at that time. Remember, this is just after the Shah was send packing. Europe, Russia and the US all favoured Iraq. So, at the time of the Osirak attack, I have little doubt that Israel probabely looked like a much bigger threat to Iraq. Israel had superior military abilities than Iran. It enjoyed a far better political and military relationship with the US than any other country in the region. Also it had proven itself even before Osirak to be aggressive and eager to establish itself as a regional hegemon by fair, foul or military means. So, I don't think it is at all unreasonable to posit that Israel was of more longterm concern to Hussein in the early 80s than was Iran. Thus, if Hussain decided to accelerate his nuclear program in the early 80s, I don't think it is unreasonable to suggest that the Osirik attack had a lot to do with it. Did Iraq accelerate its program in the early 80s? Or was it always a priority? Well, I've read that top emigre Iraqi nuclear scientists have asserted that that this was indeed the case. And their assertions have some credibility behind them. Prior to Osirak, Iraq was in full compliance with both IAEA guidelines and the nuclear weapons treaty whose formal name escapes me. Or so I understand. At any event, compliance ceased in the 80s. Why? Okay, there was a war going on between Iran and Iraq. But before that war soured for Iraq, there was the Osirak attack. So, it seems to me that Chomsky's using the verb 'to set off' is not entirely unreasonable. Particularly, when he is making a point in parenthesis.

A few other points. You find it questionable that Hussein would have Osirak built considering his oil reserves. Okay. But neither of us are experts on nuclear engineering and if I read that the reactor was specifically built so that it could not produce plutonium I feel sort of compelled to think building Osirak is not evidence of evil intent. Particularly when oil is so useful in the international market place and when a regime might want to maximize its foreign earnings or even its leverage in the market. Or maybe I'm missing your point here.

I also think Hussein probabely always dreamed of having nukes. But the question may well be, when did he decide to seriously pursue them as something more than a cautiously pursued longterm goal? And, again, if I read that Iraqi scientists say Osirak was the key moment, I'm not sure I immediately see a reason for doubt.

Obviously Israel is going to be a security consideration for any country in the Middle East, but I think Iran loomed much larger for Iraq than anything else, and especially before the Osirak strike. Here is why: Iran is three times as large as Iraq, with a much larger population, and a capital which is conveniently much harder to hit from Iraq than Baghdad is to hit from Iran. When Iran had its revolution, and royally pissed off the U.S., Saddam Hussein saw a chance to strike when Iran was momentarily weak and internationally isolated.

Of all the times to attack Iran, the period right after the revolution was the smartest, but the move was still a monumental blunder of Saddam Hussein's part, since even with all its internal strife Iran managed to pull together reasonably quickly and counter-attack. It's true that Iraq enjoyed a fair bit of early success when the war started, but after a surprisingly short time things were going very badly for Iraq indeed. So contrary to what Peter writes, it didn't take long for it to become clear that Iraq was in a pinch, and moreover, that the Iranian regime, scenting victory, was in no mood for any kind of compromise (indeed, they wanted Saddam Hussein's head on a platter). At least, this is according to everything I've ever read on the history of the Iraq/Iran war.

Peter says "a country rarely starts a war unless it has a fair bit of confidence about it chances" - except that it wasn't a country that started the war, it was Saddam Hussein. To describe Saddam Hussein as a man who always bet on the lame horse would be a bit of an understatement. Try one hooked up to a respirator.

Even without the war, Iraq would have had plenty to fear from Iran, especially with a newly energized Shi'ite regime inspiring a restless and long-marginalized Shi'ite majority within Iraq. The cultural and religious affinity between Iran and Southern Iraq shouldn't be overestimated, but it was quite enough to make a secular Sunni regime more than a bit skittish. And there were territorial disputes between the countries (the original pretext for the actual war). These were exactly the kind of people I would want to keep at bay with nuclear weapons if I were running a secular Sunni regime, and this is one issue we don't need to explain by appealing to Saddam Hussein's evil. (Probable uses of such weapons, yes - but not the forces driving their development.) Who wouldn't want nuclear weapons in such a situation?

Now when I add all that together, it seems to me, as I've said before, that Israel may have been a factor in the development of Iraq's nuclear weapons program, but that a) the development of that program was causally overdetermined; and b) entirely rational fear of Iran surely played a larger role.

Now does Israel have a rational or constructive foreign policy? No. But that wasn't the question. The question was what role Israel played in the development of Iraq's nuclear weapons program. My contention is that the main role it played was in teaching Saddam Hussein to hide the program better. As for the program itself, it surely had many causes, but if we're talking about the stumulus of rational fear, I think Israel's contribution was insignificant compared to Iran's.

Peter seems to think that I'm being overly fussy about all this. And of course Chomsky makes this remark in an aside. But if I'm right then Chomsky is wrong about something important. It's not like he's just botched a date or something. We're talking about the causes of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, something that seems especially important to get a clear view of.

Posted by Chris at July 30, 2004 03:39 PM